Dean's Professor of Finance
The Paul Merage School of Business
University of California, Irvine
4291 Pereira Drive
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
Phone: (949) 824-5615
Yuhai Xuan is Dean's Professor of Finance in The Paul Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine, and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Management Science, and the Journal of Empirical Finance. Prior to joining UC Irvine, he served on the faculty of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2015–2019) and the Harvard Business School (2006–2015).
Professor Xuan's research focuses on empirical corporate finance, corporate governance, and behavioral finance. His work has been published in leading academic journals in finance, and has been covered in various media outlets, including Bloomberg, The Economist, the Financial Times, Forbes, The New York Times, Reuters, and The Wall Street Journal. He has been awarded the 2011 Jensen Prize (First Place Winner) for the best corporate finance paper published in the Journal of Financial Economics, and has presented his work at more than 40 universities and numerous national and international conferences.
Professor Xuan has taught a variety of courses in the undergraduate, MBA, Master of Finance, and Executive Education programs and won multiple teaching awards. He has been selected to the List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent and earned three consecutive Best Professor awards at Illinois, and has been awarded the Harvard University Certificate of Distinction in Teaching. Additionally, he served as the inaugural Academic Director of the Online MBA program at Illinois and was the recipient of the 2018–2019 Dean's Impact Award for his leadership role in the program.
Professor Xuan holds an A.M. and a Ph.D. in Business Economics from Harvard University.
|More than Money: Venture Capitalists on Boards|
with Natee Amornsiripanitch and Paul GompersAbstract
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Volume 35, Issue 3, November 2019, pp. 513–543.
We explore patterns of board structure and function in the venture capital industry, identifying factors that influence whether venture capitalists receive a board seat and whether they take action to help portfolio companies in which they invest. In a comprehensive sample of US-based and non-US-based companies, we find that a venture capital firm's prior relationship with the founder, lead investor status, track record, network size, and geographical proximity to the portfolio company are positively correlated with its likelihood of taking a board seat in an investment round. When venture capital investors serve on the board, portfolio companies tend to recruit managers and board members from these investors' network and are more likely to exit via relationship-based acquisitions. These patterns are particularly strong for successful and well-connected venture capitalists on the board.
|Employee Representation and Financial Leverage|
with Chen Lin and Thomas SchmidAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 127, Issue 2, February 2018, pp. 303–324.
We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms' supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees' and owners' representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with over 2,000 domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law's introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks' interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.
with Malcolm BakerOnline Appendix
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 121, Issue 1, July 2016, pp. 66–78.
There is a strong link between measures of stock market performance and subsequent equity issues. We find that management turnover weakens the link between equity issues and the returns that preceded the new CEO. Moreover, there is a discontinuity in the distribution of equity issues around the specific share price that the CEO inherited, while there is no discontinuity around salient share prices prior to turnover. The evidence suggests that capital allocation involves an attribution of past returns not only to the firm but also to its CEO. A corollary is that a firm with poor stock market performance may be better able to raise new capital if its current CEO is replaced.
|The Cost of Friendship|
with Paul Gompers and Vladimir MukharlyamovAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 119, Issue 3, March 2016, pp. 626–644.
We investigate how personal characteristics affect people's desire to collaborate and whether this attraction enhances or detracts from performance in venture capital. We find that venture capitalists who share the same ethnic, educational, or career background are more likely to syndicate with each other. This homophily reduces the probability of investment success, and the detrimental effect is most prominent for early-stage investments. A variety of tests show that the cost of affinity is most likely attributable to poor decision making by high-affinity syndicates after the investment is made. These results suggest that "birds-of-a-feather-flock-together" effects in collaboration can be costly.
|Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes|
with Joy IshiiAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 112, Issue 3, June 2014, pp. 344–363.
This paper investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. Using data on educational background and past employment, we construct a measure of the extent of cross-firm social connection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms. We find that between-firm social ties have a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon merger announcement. Moreover, acquirer-target social ties significantly increase the likelihood that the target firm's CEO and a larger fraction of the target firm's pre-acquisition board of directors remain on the board of the combined firm after the merger. This also holds true at the level of individual target directors. An individual target director is more likely to be retained on the post-merger board if that target director has more social connections to the acquirer's directors and senior executives. In addition, we find that acquirer CEOs are more likely to receive bonuses and are more richly compensated for completing mergers with targets that are highly connected to the acquiring firms, that acquisitions are more likely to occur between two firms that are well-connected to each other through social ties, and that such acquisitions are more likely to subsequently be divested for performance-related reasons. Taken together, our results suggest that social ties between the acquirer and the target lead to poorer decision-making and lower value creation for shareholders overall.
with Chen Lin, Yue Ma, and Paul MalatestaAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 109, Issue 2, August 2013, pp. 517–534.
We examine the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership, control and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the firm's choice between bank debt and public debt. A one-standard-deviation increase in the divergence reduces the borrowing firm's reliance on bank debt financing (measured by the ratio of bank debt to total debt) by approximately 23%. The effect of the control-ownership divergence on borrowing firms' debt choice is more pronounced for firms with high financial distress risk, firms that are informationally opaque, and firms that are family-controlled. Moreover, this effect is weakened by the presence of multiple large owners and in countries with strong shareholder rights. In addition, we find that the control-ownership divergence affects other aspects of debt structure such as debt maturity and security. Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring.
with Michael Firth, Chen Lin, and Ping LiuAbstract
Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 51, Issue 1, March 2013, pp. 165–200.
This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell-side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms' commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias towards a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and in the long run for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business-related analysts. In addition, we find that subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.
with Chen Lin, Yue Ma, and Paul MalatestaAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 104, Issue 1, April 2012, pp. 1–22 (Lead Article).
Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.
|The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Acquisition of Private Companies|
with Paul Gompers
in Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, edited by James Barth, Chen Lin, and Clas Wihlborg, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012.
with Chen Lin and Yue MaAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 102, Issue 2, November 2011, pp. 416–431.
This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994-2002 period, we find that the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher for companies with a wider insider control-ownership divergence, suggesting that companies whose corporate insiders have larger excess control rights are more financially constrained. The effect of insider excess control rights on external finance constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity and for firms with financial misreporting, and is moderated by institutional ownership. The results suggest that the agency problems associated with the control-ownership divergence can have a real impact on corporate financial and investment outcomes.
with Chen Lin, Yue Ma, and Paul MalatestaAbstract
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 100, Issue 1, April 2011, pp. 1–23 (Lead Article; First Place Winner of the 2011 Jensen Prize for the Best Paper in the Areas of Corporate Finance and Organizations published in the Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of Financial Economics All-Star Paper).
This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996-2008 period, we find that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner's control rights and cash-flow rights and investigate factors that affect this relation. Our results suggest that potential tunneling and other moral hazard activities by large shareholders are facilitated by their excess control rights. These activities increase the monitoring costs and the credit risk faced by banks and, in turn, raise the cost of debt for the borrower.
The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 22, No. 12, December 2009, pp. 4919–4948.Abstract
This article investigates how the job histories of CEOs influence their capital allocation decisions when they preside over multi-divisional firms. I find that, after CEO turnover, divisions not previously affiliated with the new CEO receive significantly more capital expenditures than divisions through which the new CEO has advanced. The pattern of reverse-favoritism in capital allocation is more pronounced if the new CEO has less authority or if the unaffiliated divisions have more bargaining power. I find evidence that having a specialist CEO negatively affects segment investment efficiency. The results suggest that new specialist CEOs use the capital budget as a bridge-building tool to elicit cooperation from powerful divisional managers in previously unaffiliated divisions.
|with Da Huo and Mingzhu Tai
Adverse housing market events can affect credit conditions not only by hurting the financial fundamentals of banks, but may also by changing the lending behaviors of individual loan officers. In this paper, we test the latter mechanism by analyzing loan-level mortgage applications from 2008 to 2016 and utilizing a distinctive setup in the home foreclosure process: foreclosure auctions are typically held live at the county courthouse, thus making the county-wise foreclosures more salient to loan officers working nearby. By comparing lending outcomes across loan applications within the same county and across branches of the same bank, we find that mortgage lending standards are more stringent when the decisions are made in bank branches next to county courthouses, resulting in higher rejection rates and smaller approved loan size. Accordingly, aggregating at the branch level, credit supply is significantly tighter at bank branches next to the courthouses relative to other branches of the same bank within the same county. We show that this salience effect on lending decisions and credit supply increases in the county-wise foreclosure intensity, and these effects are especially pronounced among high-risk borrowers and for branches belonging to small-sized banks. Our results are not driven by fundamental differences in borrower and branch characteristics of neighborhoods next to the courthouses and remain robust in a matched sample of branches and loan applications. Overall, our findings provide micro-level evidence that adverse news can have significant impacts on credit market outcomes by changing the risk preferences and beliefs of individual financial decision makers.
|with Po-Hsuan Hsu, Yiqing Lü, and Hong Wu
This paper examines the influence of directors' job security on firms' innovation project choices. Using the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation as an exogenous threat to directors' job security, we find that after legislative changes, the affected firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with more transient investors or greater needs for board expertise. Moreover, firms reduce innovation more in fields unfamiliar to directors. Our results suggest that directors have incentives to avoid risky innovation when facing greater job insecurity.
|with Heitor Almeida, Ruidi Huang, and Ping Liu
We study the impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, or Obamacare) on firm employment and performance using hand-collected firm-level employee health insurance data. PPACA is associated with a significant increase in health insurance premia for employees in company-sponsored health insurance plans. We show theoretically and empirically that employers with higher employee coverage on their health insurance plans prior to the PPACA reduce enrollment in these plans after the law was enacted. In addition, the reduction in employer-sponsored health insurance plan enrollment is more pronounced for employers that used to offer basic, low cost health insurance plans to their employees. We also find suggestive evidence that firms reduce enrollment by shifting their employment composition from full-time employees to part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers, who are not covered in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. We do not find any evidence of deterioration in performance at companies that were more exposed to PPACA.
with Ruidi HuangAbstract
Winner of the China International Conference in Finance Best Paper Award
This paper demonstrates the tacit benefits that accrue to both politicians and the firms to which they are connected through stock ownership. Specifically, we show strong evidence that politicians use private information and political favors for financial gains from stock investments in their personal portfolios, and that these favors have a real impact on the value and economic outcomes of the firms in which they invest. To do so, we assemble the stock ownership and trading data for all members of the U. S. Congress from 2010 to 2013 and use the passage of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act in 2012 as an experiment to examine changes in politicians' trading performance as well as in firm value and outcomes. We find that prior to the STOCK Act, members of the Congress earn significant abnormal returns on their stock trades, and an increase in their holdings of a firm's stock positively predicts the firm's likelihood of being acquired as well as its revenue and earnings surprises. After the passage of the Act, politicians exhibit no such informational advantage in trading or outperformance. On the firms' side, we show that companies with politician ownership on average lose 1.4% in value during the three-day window around the Act's passage, while firms not owned by politicians experience no abnormal returns. Correspondingly, after the Act's passage, these politician-owned firms lose a significant amount of procurement contracts and government grants and become less likely to be selected by the government into high-profile trade missions compared to during the pre-Act period. We find that these mutual benefits are particularly pronounced for politicians who are powerful and firms that are politically active.
|with Ping Liu
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending expiration of fixed-term employment contracts creates incentives for CEOs to engage in strategic window-dressing activities. We find that, compared to normal periods, CEOs manage earnings more aggressively when they are in the process of contract renegotiations. Correspondingly, during CEO contract renewal times, firms are more likely to report earnings that meet or narrowly beat analyst consensus forecasts. Moreover, CEOs also reduce the amount of negative firm news released during their contract negotiation years. On the other hand, we find that merger and acquisition deals announced during the contract renegotiation year yield higher announcement returns than deals announced during other periods, suggesting that the upcoming contract expiration and renewal can also have disciplinary effects on potential value-destroying behaviors of CEOs. In addition, we show that firms whose CEOs are not subject to contract renewal pressure do not experience such corporate policy changes and that CEOs who engage in manipulation during contract renewal obtain better employment terms in their new contracts, in terms of contract length, severance payment, and salary and bonus. Overall, our results indicate that job uncertainty created by expiring employment contracts induces changes in managerial behaviors that have significant impacts on firm financial activities and outcomes.
|Gender Effects in Venture Capital|
|with Paul Gompers, Vladimir Mukharlyamov, and Emily Weisburst
We explore gender differences in performance in a comprehensive sample of venture capital investments in the United States. We find that female venture capitalists significantly underperform their male colleagues controlling for personal characteristics including employment and educational history as well as the characteristics of the portfolio companies in which they invest. When we examine their performance differences, we find that the difference results from a lack of contribution by the male colleagues within their firms. We explore the mechanism for this lack of contribution from male colleagues in a large sample survey of female venture capitalists and in detailed one-on-one interviews. We find support for the notion that formal feedback mechanisms and hierarchies are useful in ameliorating the female performance gap. Female venture capitalists find gender bias in informal mentoring systems as well as in the attitude of entrepreneurs.
|Bridge Building in Venture Capital-Backed Acquisitions|
|with Paul Gompers
This paper studies the role of common venture capital investors in alleviating asymmetric information between public acquirers and private venture capital-backed targets. We find that acquisition announcement returns are more positive for acquisitions in which both the target and the acquirer are financed by the same venture capital firm. Similarly, having a common investor increases both the likelihood that a transaction will be all equity-financed as well as the fraction of stock in the overall acquisition payment. In addition, an acquisition is more likely to take place when there is a common venture capital investor linking the acquirer and the target. Our results suggest that common venture capital investors can form a bridge between acquiring and target firms that reduces asymmetric information associated with the transaction for both parties.
with Mato Njavro
Harvard Business School Case 215-077 and Harvard Business School Teaching Note 215-078.
|Magna International, Inc. (A)
Magna International, Inc. (B)
with Timothy Luehrman
Harvard Business School Case 211-044, Harvard Business School Case 211-045, and Harvard Business School Teaching Note 211-077.
|Shenzhen Development Bank|
with Xiaobing Bai and Li Jin
Harvard Business School Case 210-020 and Harvard Business School Teaching Note 211-070.
Ph.D., Business Economics (Finance), Harvard University (Cambridge, MA)
A.M., Business Economics (Finance), Harvard University (Cambridge, MA)
|University of California, Irvine|
|2019–||Dean's Professor, The Paul Merage School of Business|
||Professor of Finance, The Paul Merage School of Business|
Cases in Corporate Financial Management, Undergraduate and Master of Finance (Elective Curriculum)
|University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign|
|2018–2019||Professor, Department of Finance, Gies College of Business|
Robert and Karen May Faculty Fellow, Gies College of Business
Academic Director, Online MBA (iMBA) Program, Gies College of Business
Associate Professor, Department of Finance, Gies College of Business
Cases in Financial Strategy, Master of Science in Finance (Elective Curriculum)
Selected to the List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent (with "Outstanding" ratings), 2016, 2017, 2018
Voted Best Professor by the Master of Science in Finance Class of 2016, Class of 2017, Class of 2018
|2012–2015||Marvin Bower Fellow, Harvard Business School|
|2012–2015||Associate Professor, Finance Unit, Harvard Business School|
|2006–2012||Assistant Professor, Finance Unit, Harvard Business School|
||Head Teaching Fellow, Harvard University|
Global Immersion (China), Field Immersion Experiences for Leadership Development, MBA (Required Curriculum)
|2010–2015||Finance for Senior Executives, Executive Education|
|2009–2015||Corporate Financial Management, MBA (Elective Curriculum)|
|2006–2008||First-Year Finance, MBA (Required Curriculum)|
Corporate Finance; Introductory Econometrics; MBA Analytics Program
Awarded Harvard University Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, 2004, 2005
HONORS AND AWARDS
Management Science Distinguished Service Award, Management Science
Dean's Professor, The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine
Dean's Impact Award, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (awarded State of Illinois Recognition by Senator Scott Bennett of the 100th General Assembly, December 6, 2018)
List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent, with "Outstanding" ratings (top 10%), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Best Professor, voted by the Master of Science in Finance Class of 2018, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
CICF Best Paper Award, China International Conference in Finance (CICF)
List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent, with "Outstanding" ratings (top 10%), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Best Professor, voted by the Master of Science in Finance Class of 2017, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Robert and Karen May Faculty Fellow, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent, with "Outstanding" ratings (top 10%), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Best Professor, voted by the Master of Science in Finance Class of 2016, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
All-Star Paper, for a high number of citations per year since publication, Journal of Financial Economics
Marvin Bower Fellow, Harvard Business School, Harvard University
Jensen Prize, First Place Winner, for the Best Paper in the Areas of Corporate Finance and Organizations, Journal of Financial Economics
|2005||Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University|
|2004||Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University|
Doctoral Fellowship, Harvard Business School, Harvard University
Bentley University (Department of Finance), Case Western Reserve University (Weatherhead), Chinese University of Hong Kong (Faculty of Business Administration), City University of Hong Kong (College of Business, 2), Cornell University (Johnson), Dartmouth College (Tuck), Duke University (Fuqua), Erasmus University (Rotterdam), George Mason University (School of Management), George Washington University (School of Business), Harvard Business School (2), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Business School), Lingnan University (Department of Economics, 2), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sloan), Michigan State University (Broad), National University of Singapore (Business School), New York University (Stern), Ohio State University (Fisher), Pennsylvania State University (Smeal), Purdue University (Krannert), Singapore Management University (Business School), The State University of New York at Buffalo (School of Management), Tilburg University (School of Economics and Management), Tsinghua University (School of Economics and Management), University of Amsterdam (Business School), University of Bristol (School of Economics, Finance and Management), University of California, Irvine (Paul Merage, 2), University of Chicago (Booth), University of Cincinnati (Lindner), University of Delaware (Lerner), University of Exeter (Business School), University of Florida (Warrington), University of Geneva (Geneva Finance Research Institute), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Gies, 2), University of Iowa (Tippie), University of Lausanne (HEC), University of Michigan (Ross, 2), University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Kenan-Flagler), University of Notre Dame (Mendoza), University of Rochester (Simon), University of Texas at Austin (McCombs), University of Utah (Eccles), University of Washington (Foster, 2), University of Zurich (Department of Banking and Finance), Washington University in St. Louis (Olin), American Economic Association Annual Meeting (2007), American Finance Association Annual Meeting (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019), Annual Conference on Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation at Washington University in St. Louis (2017), China International Conference in Finance (2018), CSEF-EIEF-SITE Conference on Finance and Labor (2015), Drexel University Annual Academic Conference on Corporate Governance (2015), European Finance Association Annual Meeting (2015, 2020), European Financial Management Association Annual Meeting (2019), The Financial Intermediation Research Society Annual Conference (2012), Kauffman Foundation Early-Stage Investing Conference (2013), Minnesota Corporate Finance Conference (2014), National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute Law and Economics Workshop (2010), Red Rock Finance Conference (2015), Singapore International Conference on Finance (2010), Society for Financial Studies Finance Cavalcade (2018), Texas Finance Festival (2009), Western Finance Association Annual Meeting (2015)
SELECT MEDIA COVERAGE
Bloomberg (June 21, 2012), Business Insider (November 20, 2013; June 29, 2014), The Economist (June 30, 2012), Financial Times (August 24, 2012), Forbes (November 12, 2014), Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (June 16, 2009; January 14, 2010; November 26, 2010; August 15, 2019), The New York Times (June 2, 2012; April 1, 2015), Psychology Today (July/August 2017), Reuters (August 21, 2014), The Wall Street Journal (June 18, 2012; April 12, 2013; April 30, 2017)
PHD DISSERTATION COMMITTEES
Ruidi Huang (Co-Chair; Southern Methodist University), Nuri Ersahin (Michigan State University), Hwanki Brian Kim (Baylor University), Spyridon Lagaras (University of Pittsburg), Ping Liu (The State University of New York at Buffalo; Purdue University)
Associate Editor, Management Science, 2018–
Associate Editor, Journal of Empirical Finance, 2016–
Associate Editor, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2012–
Provost's Workgroup on Alternative Digital Credentials (2020), Graduate Council, Academic Senate (2019–), Ad Hoc Promotion and Tenure Committee (Chair, 2019), Master's Programs Committee (2019–), Joint Master's Degree Programs Committee (2019–), Graduate Programs Advisory Committee (2018–2019), iMBA Program Specialized Faculty Search Committee (Chair and Diversity Advocate, 2018–2019), iMBA Program Faculty Advisory Committee (2016–2019; Chair, 2017–2019)
|Conference Discussant and Session Chair|
American Finance Association Annual Meeting (2007, 2009, 2012), China International Conference in Finance (2018, 2019), Drexel University Annual Academic Conference on Corporate Governance (2011, 2018, 2020), Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting (2019), Society for Financial Studies Finance Cavalcade (2015), Yale-European Corporate Governance Institute-Oxford Conference on Corporate Governance (2010)
|Conference Program Committees|
China International Conference in Finance (2018–), Drexel University Annual Academic Conference on Corporate Governance (2017–), European Finance Association Annual Meeting (2013–), European Financial Management Association Annual Meeting (2015–), Financial Management Association Annual Meeting (2019–), Financial Management Association Asia/Pacific Conference (2017, 2019–), Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting (Track Chair, 2016), Summer Institute of Finance Conference (2019), Utah Winter Finance Conference (2013–), Western Finance Association Annual Meeting (2010–)
Contemporary Accounting Research, Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, European Financial Management, Financial Management, Journal of Banking & Finance, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economics & Business, The Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, The Journal of Law & Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Management Science, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Review of Finance, The Review of Financial Studies, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Swiss National Science Foundation